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Hans-W. Micklitz 
Tue Maastricht Treaty, the Principle of Subsidiarity 
and the Theory of Integration 
I. The Maastricht Treaty- where is the concem? 1 
The Maastricht Treaty has raised objection and criticism from all sides, from the 
Member States, from the Community Organs, from public interest groups. lt is 
striking to see that the substance matter of the Maastricht Treaty can hardly alone 
explain the public concern. The roots and sources must be found elsewhere in the 
silent dynamics of the European integration process, bound to markets, but chal-
lenging social and traditional structures and the missing public discussion on the 
objective of the integration process. lt is right here where the subsidiarity principle 
comes into play, as an instrument to balance out the tensions between the Member 
States, the Community Organs and the European citizens. lt seems as if the dis-
cussions around the role and functions of subsidiarity principle in the Community 
legal order provide a chance to make good what has been neglected not only dur-
ing the Maastricht negotiation rounds but at least during the last five years, after 
the adoption of the Single European Act. The subsidiarity principle is inherently 
linked to federalism. lt enhances the discussion on the competition between legal 
orders and it gives space for the Member States to tak:e initiatives beyond the Com-
munity legal order2. Crisis is a opportunity and the Danish »no» to Maastricht is an 
irretrievable chance to rediscuss under the notion of subsidiarity the European ed-
ifice beyond the European legal order3. 
This paper is based on my habi1itation on »Internationales Produktsicherheitsrecht», 
Bremen 1992. r would like to emphasise two papers which have inspired me in my research on 
subsidiarity: N. Reich, Competition Between Legal Orders: Anew paradigm ofEC Law?, CMLR 
28, 1992, 861 et seq. and Ch. Joerges, European Economic Law, the Nation State and the Maas-
tricht Treaty, tobe published in R. Dehousse (ed.), The European Union Treaty, München 1993; 
a paper which has its predecessor: Markt ohne Staat? Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Gemein-
schaft und die Renaissance der regulativen Politik, in R. Wildenmann (ed.) Staatswerdung Eu-
ropas? Optionen einer Europäischen Union, 191, 254 et seq. 
2 With respect to the »Competition between legal orders». cf. N. Reich, loc.cit. 
3 The Edinburgh meeting of the Council of Ministers where the subsidiarity principle was 
extensively discussed and reshaped, witnesses the politicisation of the debate on the European 
future, cf. Schlußfolgerungen der Tagung des Europäischen Rates der Staats- und Regierung-
schefs in Edinburgh am 11. und 12. Dezember 1992, reprinted in Europa-Archiv, Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Politik Heft 1 1993, D 1 et seq. 
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1. The substance matter of the Maastricht Treaty and the public opinion 
Does it really present what it stands for: The building not only of a European Mar-
ket, but an Economic, Monetary and a Political Union?4 There seems tobe a wide-
spread consensus in legal doctrine that the revolutionary element, if any, lies in the 
Monetary Union. E. Steindorff writes5: 
»Bei der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion geht es heute - vereinfacht ausge-
drückt - aus der Sicht der Partner wesentlich darum, die Macht der Mark und 
der Bundesbank zu brechen. Bezeichnend ist, daß nur die darauf bezüglichen 
Vertragsteile grundlegend Neues bringen .. » 
lt is nowhere tobe found in the Treaty, it is more, however, than hearsay evi-
dence that the FRG gave its consent to the Monetary Union in exchange for the 
Member States' support to the German unification. lt seems to be, however, as if 
the deal does not bear the burden. Concem has been raised in Germany, although 
the Maastricht Treaty heavily draws on the German Bundesbank6. lt suffices to re-
fer to the manifest of the sixty economists against Maastricht7. And for the rest of 
the Maastricht Treaty, the Economic Union and the Political Union? Economic 
Policy remains national in substance. The Member States will retain their general 
powers, the Community is bound to coordination of govemmental actors, Art. 1038. 
lt remains to be seen whether coordination suffices to balance out possible tensions 
between a europeanised monetary policy and a remaining national economic poli-
cy. More or less the same holds true for the industrial policy, Art. 130, another sub-
ject of major concem in the discussion9. The Maastricht Treaty does not introduce 
industrial policy as a subject of a European Policy, this has already been done in 
the Single European Act10• True, Art, 130 extends and further develops industrial 
policy, but it is not put in the hands of the Community. »Contribution» of the Com-
munity to the national industrial policy shall be made possible, but only ifthe Coun-
cil after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Com-
4 Cf. R. Dehousse (ed.) The European Union Treaty, München 1993. 
5 Cf. Quo vadis Europa? Freiheiten, Regulierung und soziale Rechte nach den erweiterten 
Zielen der EG-Verfassung, in: Forschungsinstitut für Wirtschaftsverfassung und Wettbewerb, ev. 
(ed.) Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften und der Marktwirtschaft, Köln-Ber-
1in-Bonn-München, Heft 148 1992, 11-12. 
6 On the role of the De~.tsche Bundesbank in the Maastricht Treaty, cf. 
7 Cf. Manifest von 60 Okonomen gegen Maastricht, as documented in Integration 4/1992, 
229 et seq. 
8 Cf. Ch. Joerges, The Maastricht Treaty, loc.cit., E. Steindorff, Quo Vadis, loc.cit. 
9 From the legal side, cf. E. Steindorff, Quo Vadis, loc.cit. 56 et seq.; comprehensively 
A. VeeJken, Normstrukturen der Industriepolitik- Eine vergleichende Untersuchung nach deut-
schem und französischem Recht, 1991. 
1° Cf. Ch.-P. Frees, Das neue industriepolitische Konzept der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 
EuR 1991, 281 et seq. where he discusses the Cornrnission's recent statement of its policy: In-
dustrial policy in an open and competitive environment: guidelines for a Community approach, 
COM (90) 556 final of 16 November 1990. 
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mittee has unanimously agreed on a Commission's proposal. Here another objec-
tion should be registered, and again it is coming from the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. Europeanisation of the industrial policy is seen to endanger the economic 
constitution of the FRG, in which industrial policy is not seen as a task attributed 
to the government11 • 
Europeanisation of the social policy12 is another subject of concem. Here the 
Member States are clashing together. Denmark fears that a European social policy 
will 1ower their social Standards and set aside what is seen as an integral part of 
the Scandinavian model. The UK, quite to the contrary, has raised objections 
against each and every delegation of social powers away from the Member States 
to the Community13 • Again, one should carefully analyse whether the provisions in 
the Maastricht Treaty justify the political debate. Social policy has been a subject 
of the Community before, and has not been europeanised at Maastricht, let alone 
the problems which result from the different levels of integration14• The newly 
introduced section on consumer protection, Art. 129 a, was certainly not the cor-
nerstone in the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty, although the subject matter 
gains importance beyond the narrow borders of nation states15• Consumer protec-
tion existed before, most of the directives coming under that scope were based on 
Art. 100 a16• 
Last but not least, one could make the overall objective ofthe Maastricht Trea-
ty to establish a political union responsible for the reservations, the objections and 
the critics. Maastricht, however, could not stand for the establishment of a Europe-
an State 17• The powers of the Parliament have been enhanced, it has a right to veto 
in a finely tuned mechanism drawn from federalist systems which are familiar with 
the necessity to balance out conflicting interests between different actors in the law-
making process 18• Majority voting will exist in the field of transport policy Art. 75, 
11 From the Iegal-political side, cf. h. Siebert, Die Weisheit einer höheren Instanz, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung of 14. 3. 1992, 15; M. E. Streit, Krücken für die Champignons, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung of 20 June 1992, E.-J. Mestmäcker, Wettwewerb oder Industriepolitik: Nicht 
nur in diesem Punkt verstößt der Vertrag von Maastricht gegen bewährte Grundsätze des Ver-
trages von Rom, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of lO October 1992, 15. 
12 Fora broader anaJysis St. Leibfried, Wohlfährtstaatliche Entwicklungspotentiale - Die EG 
nach Maastricht, NOV 1992, 107 et seq. 
13 The Uk has not signed the European Social Charta, cf. Ph. Watson, The European Social 
Charter, 28, CMLR 1991, 37 et seq. 
14 May eleven countries develop an »acquis communautaire»? A question raised by Ch. Jo-
erges, The Maastricht Treaty, loc.cit. 
15 Cf. H.-W. Micklitz/N. Reich, Verbraucherschutz im Vertrag über die Europäische Union -
Perspektiven für 1993, EuZW J 992, 593 et seq. 
16 More comprehensively now, N. Reich, Europäisches Verbraucherrecht, 1993 forthcoming. 
17 Cf. R. Bieber, Democratization of the European Community through the European Parlia-
ment, Aussenwirtschaft 46 (1991) 159 et seq. 
18 Cf. H.-J. Rabe, Europäische Gesetzgebung -das unbekannte Wesen, NJW 1993, 1 et seq.; 
Th. Oppermann/C. D. Classen, Die EG vor der Europäischen Union, NJW 1993, 5 et seq. 7, cf. 
especially the scheme W. Wessels, developed, Integration, 1992, 2 ( 11 ); Nentwich, Institutionelle 
und verfahrensrechtliche Neuerungen im Vertrag über Maastricht, EuZw 1992, 235 et seq. 
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trade policy Art. 113 and environmental policy, Art. 130 s. And the Comrnission 
will, in limits, be dependent on the consent of the European Parliament, Art. 158 
(2). 
2. The neglected public concern and the instrument to match the challenge: 
the subsidiarity principle 
The roots must be traced back to the founding principles ofthe European Commu-
nity. lt is worth while reiterating the strong language of Hallstein19: »Die Eu-
ropäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft ist in dreifacher Hinsicht ein Phänomen des 
Rechts: Sie ist Schöpfung des Rechts, sie ist Rechtsquelle, und sie ist Rechtsord-
nung» (The European Economic Community is a threefold phenomenon of law, it 
is a creation of law, it is a source of law and it is a legal order). Such an assessment 
still holds true despite the irritations the European Community had to undergo in 
the seventies. The push towards the completion of the Internal market results from 
legal document20• The Single European Act has enhanced and strengthened the role 
oflaw in the integration, in quantitative and qualitative terrns. »Integration Through 
Law» is not only the title of series of books edited by M. Cappelletti/M. Seccombe 
and J. H. H. Weiler21 • The Intemal Market is entirely built on directives and regula-
tions aiming at the removal of barriers to trade22 • 
The more, however, integration moved ahead, the clearer the intrusion of Com-
munity law into nationally reserved fields became obvious. The internal market 
required its price: a minimum of social integration23• The Community had to push 
for social integration. Its involvement revealed a weakness of the Community le-
gal order. The Treaty even in its revised form was not shaped to cope with the insti-
tutional challenge which quite necessarily came up24• Consumer protection did play 
a crucial role, but not in the field of private law25 • Hannonisation of health and sa-
fety regulation was inevitable to guarantee the free trade of goods. European stan-
19 Cf. W. Hallstein, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft, 5. Auflage 1974, 33 as cited in Ch. Joer-
ges, Markt ohne Staat? Die Wirtschaftsverlassung der Gemeinschaft und die regulative Politik, 
in R:Wildemann, Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen für eine politische Union, 1991, 225 et seq. 
20 Cf. Koopmans, The role of law in the next stage of European Integration 35 ( 1986) I.C.L.Q. 
925 et seq. 
21 Cf. M. Cappelletti/M. Seccombe/J. Weiler, Integration Through Law, Europe and theAmer-
ican Federal Experience, Volume 1 to 3, 1986. 
22 Cf. J. Falke, Föderalismus und rechtliche Regulierung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 
in G. Stuby (ed.) Föderalismus und Demokratie, 1992, 195 et seq. 
23 Cf. N. Reich, Binnenmarkt als Rechtsbegriff, EuZW 1991, 203 et seq. 
24 Cf. R. Dehousse, 1992 and Beyond: The institutional Challenge of the Single Market Pro-
gramme, Legal Issues of European Integration, 1989 (1), 109 et seq.~ K.-H. Ladeur, European 
Community Institutional Reforms, Legal Issues of European Integration, 1990, 1 et seq. 
25 Fora comprehensive analysis, G. Brüggemeier/Ch. Joerges, Europäisierung des Vertrags-
und Haftungsrechts, in P.-Ch. Müller-Graff (ed.) Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, 1993; P.-Ch. Müller-Graff, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und Privatrecht, 
Das Privatrecht in der Europäischen Integration, NJW 1993, 13 et seq. 
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dards were needed to guarantee free access to the intemal market and they had to 
be managed to keep the market open26• The European Community got necessarily 
involved in the erection of organisational structures, but did not have the means at 
hand to develop them27 • lts efforts were limited by the Treaty. The lack of ap-
propriate instruments have led the Community to indigenous activities28 • Tue co-
rnitology witness these efforts29 • At the very end, however, shortcomings, deficien-
cies and failures of missing organisational infrastructure document the intricacies 
of a legal technique which cannot overcome the constraints set out in the Treaty. 
The results of all these efforts are ambiguous: A European network of experts and 
administrators has been built30• Europeanisation is well developed here and one 
might even go one step further and conclude that the European integration process 
has nowhere better advanced than in the building of networks of organisational 
structures. This development, however, undermines the position of the nation-state 
in the Community and it might contribute to explain the Member States who try 
what they have tried to do since the founding of the European Community: to coun-
terbalance the intrusion ofEuropean law into the national legal and societal system 
by refening to their poJiticaJ sovereignty, to their still existing autonomy against a 
European Community which by market integration transforms national-states. 
The subsidiarity principle is just the last expression, one means in the long his-
tory of Member States to retain political powers against an ever growing independ-
ent legal order31• lt is the subsidiarity principle and not the sovereignty or the au-
tonomy of nation-states, which guides the aftermath of Maastricht. This needs to 
be kept in mind when it comes down to look at the consequences of competing 
26 Cf. Ch. Joerges/J. Falke/H.-W. Micklitz/G. Brtiggemeier, Die Sicherheit von Konsumgütern 
und die Entwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 1988; H.-W. Micklitz (ed) Post Market 
Control of Consumer Goods, 1990. 
27 Cf. Organisational Structures of Product Safety Regulation, in B. Stauder (ed.) La securite 
des produits de la consommation, Integration Europeenne et consommateur suisse, Actes du 
colloque organise avec Ie Centre d'etudes juridiques europeennes, Faculte de droit de Geneve, 
Fevrier 1992, 49 et seq. 
28 Cf. R. Dehousse/Ch. Joerges/G. Majone/F. Snyder in collaboration with M. Everson, Eu-
rope After 1992, New Regulatory Strategies, EUI Working Paper Law 1992/31, San Domenico 
di Fiesole/FI 1992. 
29 M. Bach, Eine leise Revolution durch Verwaltungsverfahren - Bürokratische Integrations-
prozesse in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Zeitschrift für Soziologie 21 ( 1992), 16 et seq. 
30 Research is limited here, with the exception of product safety, cf. H.-W. Micklitz/ 
Th. Roethe/S. Weatherill, Federalism and Responsibility, 1993 forthcoming. 
31 Cf. M. Wilke and M. Wallance, Subsidiarity, Approaches to Power Sharing in the European 
Community, RIIA Discussion Paper No. 27, 1990; L. A. Gee!hoed, Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel, 
een communautair principle? SEW 718 1991, 422 et seq.; J. Pipkorn, Das Sub~~diaritätsprinzip 
im Vertrag über die Europäische Union - rechtliche Bedeutung und gerichtliche Uberrpütbarkeit, 
EuZW 1992, 697 et seq.; D. Grimm, Subsidiarität ist nur ein Wort, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung of 17 of September 1992, 38; N. Emiliou, Subsidiarity. An effective Barrier Against »the 
Enterprises of Ambition», ELR 1992, 385 et seq.; A. G. Toth, The principle of subsidiarity in the 
Maastricht Treaty, 29 CMLR 1992, 1079 et seq. and D. Z. Cass, The word that saves Maastricht? 
The principle of subsidiarity and the di vision of powers within the European Community, 29 
CMLR 1992, 1107 et seq. 
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national legal orders under the umbrella of the Community legal order32• The sub-
sidiarity principle has a twofold momentum: (1) it has traditionally to do with pow-
er sharing, with defining and delimiting competences - subsidiarity here may be 
called »subsidiarity from without», but (2) subsidiarity is also linked to the inner 
organisational structure of a community, it contains at least implicitly a conception 
of what should be done at what level, and it is exactly this side of the subsidiarity 
coin which is so often neglected. Subsidiarity seen that way enhances »interbrand» 
competition between the Member States33 and the Community, it stands for the re-
percussion of power sharing on the structure of a Community, it may therefore be 
called »subsidiarity from within». Tue distinction between »subsidiarity from with-
out» and »subsidiarity from within» in, will guide us in the development of a new 
and prospective reading of the principle34• 
Subsidiarity is not an invention of the Maastricht Treaty. It existed as part of 
the Community legal order long before Maastricht35 • It has been explicitly men-
tioned in the Art. 130 r, to shape the role of the Member S tates and the Community 
in regulating environmental protection36• Art. 3 b of the Maastricht Treaty translates 
subsidiarity into a general rule, and its position in Art. 3 makes clear that it shall be 
fundamental to the European edifice37• Here lies the reason why the principle can 
be instrumentalised for each and every argument: FRG and the UK use it as a weap-
on against any Community intervention in the field of economic and social policy, 
Denmark uses it to defend its own concept of a social welfare state. The Commis-
sion refers to the subsidiarity principle to insist that the overall objective of the 
Maastricht Treaty is to create a Europe of citizens, and that the Maastricht Treaty 
determines that action must be taken where it is nearest to the peop1e38• 
II. The Subsidiarity Principle- does it challenge the Community 
legal order and established integration theories? 
The challenge today is where to settle the subsidiarity principle: is it or can it be-
come part of the legal order and if so, what will it mean for the legal order, or is it 
32 Cf. Infra, IV. 
33 Cf. For the conception of »interbrand competition», N. Reich, Competition of legal orders, 
loc.cit. 889 et seq. 
34 Cf. Infra, IV. 
35 Cf. N. Emilou, loc.cit. and M. Wilke and M. Wallace loc.cit. as to the historical sources. The 
most detailed analysis of the European history can be found in the study of D. Z. Cass, loc.cit. 
lllOetseq. 
36 For an early interpretation in the light of environmental protection, cf. D. Z. Cass, loc.cit. 
1120. 
37 Here in Artt. 2 and 3 the overall objectives of the Treaty are laid down. 
38 Cf. Korn, SEK (92) 1990 endg. 12, 27. 11. 1992, Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip, Mitteilung der 
Kommission an den Rat und an das Europäische Parlament. 
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a political instrument to counterbalance the community legal order and even define 
its linrits? Any answer entails necessarily a concept and a theory of integration. The 
intensity of the German debate over the Maastricht Treaty, the criticism expressed 
and the efforts to linrit European regulation to framing a specific market-orientated 
economic constitution for the Community wou1d not be possible to understand 
without its theoretical background39 • And the same holds true vice versa: To instru-
mentalize the subsidiarity principle for political purposes presupposes a notion of 
what the subsidiarity should be instrumentalized for. lt could be more than an eco-
nomic constitution, it could be the emerging core of a more democratic European 
society and another, more deve1oped and better shaped Conununity legal order-40, 
where the Member States and even lower and smaller entities than the national 
government or the national legislator contribute to a Europen Community41• 
1. The Community legal order and the building of an economic constitution 
In 1981 E. Stein42 published an article in the American Journal of International Law 
under the heading of: »Lawyers, Judges, and the Mak.ing of a Transnational Con-
stitution». He analysed in the gentle tradition of common law the three pillars on 
which the Community legal order rests: supremacy, pre-emption and direct effect. 
His intention lies in the demonstration that the Treaty of Rome is more than a su-
pranational treaty of states and that is has become by the very dictum of judges an 
independent legal order, somewhere in between a typical constitution and the loose-
ly-knit rules of international organisations and international treaties43 . 
The cases which have given the Court this path breaking opportunity deserve 
no further explanation44• What interests us here are the functions of these three 
»constitutional» principles. Supremacy defines the relationship between Commu-
nity law and national law. First, it constitutes the existence of a Community legal 
order which is and which remains independent of the national legal orders. Second 
it establishes a hierarchy, under which community law prevails over national law. 
The national constitutional courts have accepted supremacy of Community law 
39 Cf. References in Fn„ cf. E. Steindorff, Quo Vadis, loc.cit. and Bareis/Ohr, Hohenheimer 
Europa Colloquium: Europäische Integration auf Abwegen - Die ordnungspolitischen und insti-
tutionellen Fehlentscheidungen von »Maastricht», 1992~ cf. L. Vollmer, Wirtschaftsverfassung 
und Wirtschaftspolitik der EG nach Maastricht, DB 1993, 25 et seq. 
4° Cf. Ch. Joerges, The Maastricht Treaty, loc.cit.; R. Dehousse, Integration v. Regulation, 
loc.cit. 
41 Cf. J. H. H. Weiler, who draws a line between »unity» and »community», The Transforma-
tion of Europe, loc.cit. 2476. 
42 Cf. E. Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of an International Constitution, American 
Journal of International Law 1981, 1 et seq. 
43 In a way this perspective is characteristic for nearly his followers working in a common law 
tradition, cf. J. H. Weiler, loc.cit. 
44 ECR 1963, 1 et seq. - van Gend en Loos ./. Nederlandes Administratie der Belastingen; 
ECR 1964, 585 et seq. -Costa ./. Enel. 
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over national law, perhaps because the Community legal order covered a small area 
of the national legal order, at least at its beginning45 • 
Pre-emption46, like Supremacy, relates to the relationship between Communi-
ty law and national law. Pre-emption looks at the subject matters and states that the 
Member States are no longer enabled to act in areas which are subject to the com-
petence of the Community47• The Single European Act has considerably strength-
ened the importance of the pre-emption doctrine by providing the Community with 
the exclusive competences in all matters which are necessary to complete the In-
terna! Market48• 
Direct effect is the third pillar of the community legal order49 . Citizens of the 
Member States can invoke Treaty provisions against national legal rules which run 
counter to EEC law. Direct effect is perhaps the most important element for the 
making of a constitution. The emergence of a community legal order requires that 
it is able to unfold repercussions on private individuals. The direct effect doctrine 
has become the driving force for the development of the Community legal order5°. 
German legal doctrine has never looked at the emerging legal principles alone. 
It has tried to build the Community legal order into a theoretical concept of the 
European economy and the role of the state51 • Such an approach looks behind the 
constitutional principles of the community legal order and tries to fill its regulatory 
frame with a specific content. lt is admittedly a very German debate, which is in-
evitably linked to the way in which the FRG came into being after the second world 
war52• This explains its strong commitment to the ordo-liberalism as the guiding 
45 There is no need to rediscuss the reservations of the Gennan, French and Italian supreme 
court against the supremacy doctrine. It suffices to recall that the courts were willing to follow 
the European Court of Justice, in the end and after some protest, cf. J. H. Weiler, The Transfor-
mation of Europe, loc.cit. 
46 Cf. M. Waelbrock, The Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption - Consent and Re-
delegation, in T. Sandelow/E. Stein (ed.) The Courts and the free Markets: Perspectives from the 
United States and Europe, 1982, 548 et seq. 
47 lt is not surprising that the rule was developed in the field of Common Commercial Policy, 
where the Community holds exclusive competence first, before the SEA was enacted. But its 
origin in a very specific field of Community law has never been really taken into consideration 
in the constitutionalisation process of the Community. 
411 Cf. To that respect, J. Pikorn, loc.cit. 699. 
49 There is an immense literature to the direct effect doctrine alone. References must remain 
arbitrary: cf. P. Pesctore, The doctrine of direct effect: an infant disease of Community law, 8 
(1983) ELR 155 et seq. 
5° Cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Organisierte Rechtsdurchsetzung, KritV 1992, 172 et seq. 
51 Cf. A. Müller-Armack, Die Wirtschaftsordnung des Gemeinsamen Marktes in idem: Wirt-
schaftsordnung und Wirtschaftspolitik. Studien und Konzepte zur sozialen Marktwirtschaft und 
zur europäischen Integration, 1964, 401 et seq.~ J. Scherer, Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Eu-
ropäischen Gemeinschaft, 1970; D. W. Rahmsdorf, Ordnungspolitischer Dissens und eu-
ropäische Integration, 1980; H. v.d. Groeben. Zur Wirtschaftsordnung der europäischen Gemein-
schaft 1981, in: id. Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Herausforderungen unserer Zeit. 
Aufsätze und Reden 1967-1987, 1987, 201 et seq. 
52 There is few literature outside Germany on the so called Wirtschaftsverfassung, cf. A. Ni-
cholls, The Other Germany -The »Neo-Uberals», in R. J. Bullen/H. Pogge von Strandmann/ 
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principle for the European economic constitution53 • »Ordnungspolitik» has made 
its way through the floors of the Maastricht negotiation rounds and might become 
part of legal European doctrine. The starting point of the theory is that the Treaty 
of Rome contains a decision for a European law, which has to guide the European 
integration in a specific way. The »visible» law54 of the Treaty is regarded as eco-
nomic constitutional law, because it relies on the market as the decisive integration 
factor-in contrast to state-guided and organised economies. The driving of forces 
of integration are the enterprises, the entrepreneurs, and not the states. Visible law 
is not economic constitutional law alone, it is at the same time economic constitu-
tional law, because it intends to constitute the internal market by way of a compet-
iti ve process55 • 
Supremacy, direct effect and pre-emption represent elements of that economic 
constitution. Supremacy is not regarded as a value in itself, its overwhelming im-
portance comes clear, when it is linked to the four freedoms and the rules on com-
petition in the Treaty56• They constitute the guiding principles of the European eco-
nomic constitution, and they shall have supremacy over national even constitution-
al laws. The direct effect doctrine entitles the entrepreneurs to enforce the freedoms 
and the competition rules, thereby creating the economic constitution. The comer-
stone for that theoretical concept is the pre-emption doctrine, which unfolds its far 
reaching repercussions in combination with the implied power doctrine57• Here it 
comes down to who has the competence, the Member States or the Community and 
what for. One should recall that exclusive competences for the Community exist 
only for the Common Commercial Policy and since the SEA for the completion of 
the Interna! Market. The latter does not challenge the so called economic constitu-
tion as long as the interplay between freedom and regulation is not disturbed, ie. 
the freedom of the entrepreneurs to operate within the Interna! Market and the re-
luctance of states to intervene into the market. The Court, however, and this is one 
of the main criticisms, has confirmed the » fraudulent» extension of competences 
by its implied power doctrine58 or even using at as a means to erode the principle of 
A. Ba. Polonsky (eds.) Ideas into Politics. Aspects of European History, 1984 and the research 
by Ch. Joerges, Markt ohne Staat, loc.cit. and The Maastricht Treaty, loc.cit. 
53 This is not the place to develop the theory on ordo-liberalism. lt contains in substance a spe-
cific conception of the society, in which the interrelationship between the state and the economy 
is determined, cf. I. Schmidt, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, 3. Auflage, 1990. 
54 Cf. E.-J. Mestmäcker, Die sichtbare Hand des Rechts, ... 
55 Cf. For a short description, Ch. Joerges, Markt ohne Staat, loc.cit. 
56 More specifically Art. 85 para 111, cf. N. Reich under the collaboration of D. Leahy, Inter-
na! Market and Diffuse Interests, An introduction to trade law, 1990, Chapter IV. 
57 That is why J. W. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, loc.cit. refers to the implied pow-
er doctrine as the third element beside supremay and direct effect, 2415, let alone that he men-
tions human rights as a fourth element, not yet foreseen in E. Stein's analysis, loc.cit. 
58 Cf. E. Steindorff, Quo Vadis, loc.cit. 37: »Die Gemeinschaft hat zu sozialen Grundrechten 
- nach Zeiten der Kompetenzerschleichung - in Maastricht erreicht, was zur Änderung des 
Grundsgesetzes anläßlich der deutschen Einheit vielfältig gefordert, namenntlich von der 
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enumerated powers59, on which the constitutionalisation of Europe was based. A 
deliberate interpretation of the competences under Art. 100 a, so runs the argument, 
has served as a basis for social regulation60 which endanger the original concept of 
the European Community61 • As each and everything affects the completion of the 
intemal market, clear boundaries between internal-market related and unrelated 
social integration measures can no longer be set. Here lies the reason and the con-
cem for the debate on »competences» in the German doctrine62• The proponents of 
the »Ordnungspolitik» invoke the competition of legal orders as an appropriate 
means to counteract the centralisation process in the European Community63 • 
Transferred to the »constitutional » elements of the Community legal order the 
subsidiarity principle seems tobe an appropriate means to challenge the basic ele-
ments of the Community legal order64: »supremacy65», »direct effect66», but most 
of all to put into question the pre-emption doctrine and to reinstall the principle of 
enumerated powers67 • Where such far-reaching consequences on the »acquis com-
munautaire» are rejected, subsidiarity is regarded as a means to use the »effet utile» 
in order to restrict competences of the Community now and no longer to enlarge 
them68 • Tue German Ministry of Economics has elaborated a list of European draft 
directives and draft regulations where the competence is denied69• In the field of 
consumer protection rules, nearly each and every project currently under discus-
derzeitigen Regierungsmehrheit in Bonn verweigert wird, nämlich ihren Auftrag zum schutz die-
ser sozialen Grundrechte». 
59 Cf. The dense analysis of the jurisprudence in J. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 
loc.cit. 2437 et seq. and K. Hailbronner, Legal Institutional Refonns of the EEC: What can be 
leam from Federation Theory and Practice, in E. Petersman (ed.) EC 92 and Beyond. New Polit-
ical Structures and Constitutional Problems of European Integration, 1991. 
60 The tenn social regulation is used herein the way it has been developed in the United States. 
lts counter notion is economic regulation; as early as 1985, N. Reich, Staatliche Regulierung 
zwischen Marktversagen und Politikversagen, Erfahrungen mit der amerikanischen Federal 
Trade Commission und ihre Bedeutung für die Entwicklung des Verbraucherschutzrechtes, Fo-
rum Rechtswissenschaft, Beiträge zu neuern Entwicklungen in der Rechtswissenschaft 12; and 
cf. Ch. Joerges, The Maastricht Treaty, loc.cit. who refers to C. R. Sunstein, After the Rights 
Revolution, Reconceiving the Regulatory State, Cambridge, Mass.-London, 1990, 11 et seq., 47 
et seq. 
61 Cf. E. Steindorff, Ouo Vadis, loc.cit. and the' same author, Grenzen der EG-Kompetenzen, 
1990. 
62 Cf. E. Steindorff, Grenzen der EG-Kompetenzen, 1990. 
63 Cf. N. Reich, Competition, loc.cit. 862, where he refers to K. Hopt (ed. Europäische Inte-
gration als Herausforderung des Rechts: Mehr Marktrecht- weniger Einzelgesetze? Veröffentli-
chungen der Hanns Martin Schleyer Stiftung Band 32, 1992, where the concept of competition 
of legal orders is discussed in a number of contributions. 
64 lt is right here where the theory on the »Ordnungspolitik» touches upon a sensitive though 
questionable element of the legal order. 
6s Cf. D. Z. Cass, loc.cit. 1129 et seq. 
66 Cf. D. Z. Cass, loc.cit. 1130 et seq. 
67 Which is much more than to challenge the doctrine of implied powers, cf. J. H. Weiler, The 
Transformation of Europe, loc.cit. 2453, believes that the mutation process as he calls it, might 
be tumed back, he does not explain, however, how that should work. 
68 Cf. In that direction, J. Pipkom, loc.cit. 700. 
69 Cf. Published in VuR l/1993. 
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sion in the different organs of the European Community shall be dropped70• The 
Ministry intends to reduce the Community powers to an »ordnungspolitischen» 
concept of implementing the four freedoms and the competition rules. Rumour 
goes that the German govemment has even considered the opportunity to restrict 
Art. 177 procedures to requests of the upper courts 71 • One could easily imagine that 
such an initiative would have met sympathetic support by the British government72 • 
It would have considerably reduced the possible impact of the Court of Justice on 
European law, as quite a number of important decisions have been requested by 
lower courts, and not only in the field of market integration73 • 
Whether or not the subsidiarity principle could become a valuab1e weapon to 
defend the economic constitution of the European Community depends on wheth-
er it is possible to transform it into a constitutional element, standing side-by-side 
with supremacy, pre-emption and direct effect74, or to submit the subsidiarity prin-
ciple to the »acquis communautaire»75 and to deprive it of any self-contained im-
portance. If a fourth principle is in the offing, the Community legal order must be 
re-balanced, if the erosion of the principle of enumerated powers can not be brought 
to a halt or even repaired, the shaping of a »constitution for the European Com-
munity» must concentrate on the scope of direct effect, on the extent to which, en-
vironmental and consumer protection rules do give rights to citizens, on the con-
tent ofthese rights, and on their enforceabi1ity76• That is why the proponents of the 
»Ordnungspolitik» put for discussion the role and function of the European Court 
of Justice77 who seems to become a promoter in the shaping of social rights. This is 
not to claim that the Court's position in the conceptualisation of the European legal 
order shall and must not be questioned. lt is necessary indeed to know whether and 
7° For an overview, cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Verbraucherrecht und EG-Binnenmarkt, Vertrag, Wer-
bung und öffnung der Rechtswege, VuR 1/1993. 
71 A restriction which exists in the Rome Convention, 80/934/EWG, 19. 6. 1980, OJ L 266, 1 
et seq. 
72 Cf. Factortame, C 213/90, 19. 6. 1990, EuZW 1990, 356 et seq.; thereto cf. D. Simon/ 
A. Barav, Le droit communautaire et Ia suspension provisoire des mesures nationales, les enjeux 
de l'affaire factortame, Revue du Marche Commun 1990, 591 et seq.; L. J. Smith, Fischereipoli-
tik, EG-Recht und die britische Justiz, EuZW 1992, 308 et seq. 
73 The assessment cannot be based on any compJexe analysis. It seems to be, however, as if 
the interesting cases, which have invited the Court to further develop the Community legal re-
sult from Art. 177 procedures, cf. Ch. Harding, Who goes to Court in Europe? An Analysis of 
Litigation against the European Community, ELR 1992, 105 et seq. 
74 Cf. On the different position of the subsidiarity principle in the American and the Canadia 
Constitution, J. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, loc.cit. 2432 et seq. 
75 Art. B makes clear that the »acquis communautaire» shall remain unaffected by, inter alia, 
the subsidiarity principle, but Art. H exernpts Art. B from judicaJ control ! The conclusions of the 
Edinburgh meeting of the Council of Ministers states that the »acquis communautaire» shall re-
main unaffected by the subsidiarity principle, cf. loc.cit. 1. Grundprinzipien, under 4, D 8. 
76 Cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Consumer Rights in A. Cassese/A. Clapham/J. H. H.Weiler (eds.), Hu~ 
man Rights and the European Community: The Substantative Law, European - The Human 
Rights Challenge, Firenze 1991, 53 et seq. 
77 Cf. E. Steindorff, Quo Vadis, loc.cit. 22 on the hand, G. Brüggemeier/Ch. Joerges, loc.cit. 
on the other. 
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to what extent the European Community could be built on law, a law which is not 
explicitly foreseen in the Treaty. If the Court of Justice pursues the path prepared 
by numerous declarations and recommendations of the European Parliament78 to 
integrate into the Community legal order human and social rights, it might run into 
a legitimacy crisis79 • lt seems as if the Community legal order needs tobe reshaped 
and that the subsidiarity principle will become a fourth element of the Community 
legal order. 
2. Maintaining or introducing a countervailing power to a predominant 
Community legal order? 
Law alone cannot decide on the concept of the European Community. The Court 
of Justice operating somewhere in the nowhere land between solid legal ground and 
conflicting legal policy80, cannot rescue the Community as a Social Space81 • The 
Member States, and this is one lesson tobe learned from the critics, which came up 
in and around Maastricht, will no longer let the Community organs go as they have 
done whilst tak.ing measures to complete the Intemal Market. The Member States 
claim political power and political influence on the Community organs. As the 
Courts' role was not changed, to some extent even strengthened82, Member States 
must bring to bear their influence in the Commission, which takes the initiatives 
and sets the law machinery into motion83• 
J. H. Weiler84 has analysed the interrelationship between the divergencies of 
legal and political developments, between the Court and the Commission on the 
hand and the Member States as represented in the Council of Ministers on the 
other. He stated, in 1982 (!), a growing interest of the Member States to influence 
the decision-making process in the Commission in order to counterbalance the 
Court's attempt to erect a supranational constitution85 • The clou of his analysis lies 
in the conclusion: The double structure of supranationalism and intergovemmen-
talism stabilises the integration process. The constant struggle between the differ-
78 Cf. A. Clapham, Human Rights and the European Community: A critical Overview: Euro-
pean Union -The Human Rights Challenge, 1991. 
79 This is what the House of Lords predicts, cf. N. Emiliou, loc.cit. 404. 
w Cf. Ch. Joerges, The Maastricht Treaty, loc.cit. 
81 Cf. D. Grimm, loc.cit. »Der Richter als Retter». 
82 Cf. Art. 171 as revised gives the court the right to put an compulsory levy on Member States 
violating EEC law. 
83 Here is the point where the subsidiarity prinicple could challenge the interinstitutional bal-
ance. 
84 Cf. The Community Legal System, The Dual Character of SupranationaJism, Yearbook of 
European Law, 1 (1981), 267 et seq. 
85 Cf. J. H. H. Weiler, Supranational Law and Supranational Legal System: Legal Structures 
and Political Process in the European Community, PH.D. Thesis European University Institute, 
Florence 1982. 
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ent organs, in and around the shaping of the legal order bears a constructi ve pro-
European element. Member States resistance and reluctance outweighs the pre-
dominance of the Community legal order. The perspective here focuses not so 
much on the economic constitution but on the pros and cons of a supranational 
community with an independent legal order. 
The further development of the European Community seems to confirm the 
mutual dependency86• Tue Single European Act has been blamed for weakening the 
Community legal order, mainly from officials of the Commission and from Mem-
bers ofthe European Court of Justice87• At the core of the critique stands Art. 100 a 
IV which allows Member States to maintain or even to insert national rules even if 
the Community has adopted measures for the completion of the lntemal Market. 
Art. 100 a IV is said not to be compatible with the idea of a homogeneous Comrnu-
nity legal order which might replace step by step national legal orders. Those who 
argue that way, insist on the building of the Community wüh the means of law and 
the technique of majority decisions. One could turn Art. 100 a IV upside down, and 
interpret it as the necessary means allowing Member States to exercise the neces-
sary influence on the Commission and on the Court88 . 
Member States have not visibly used Art. l 00 a IV to stop the integration proc-
ess or more precisely to disturb the Commission in its attempts to complete the 
Interna! Market89 • There is not a single case pending at the European Court of Jus-
tice where the function of Art. 100 a IV is at stake. That does not prove the insuffi-
ciency of Art. 100 a IV as a political instrument. The only problem is, that the ef-
fects are much more difficult to measure and hard to fix. The German Govem-
ments' attempt to oblige the German car industry to produce cars which could run 
with lead-free patrol, finally failed90• But who dares to say that it was politically 
useless91 • The attempt alone initiated a political debate, and a promising legal one!92 
86 Cf. J. H. H. Weiler, The European Community in Change: Exit. Voice and Loyality, Saar-
brUcken 1987 (Vorträge, Berichte und Reden aus dem Europa Institut), No. 109. 
87 Cf. C-D. Ehlermann, The Internal Market following the Single European Act, 24 CMLR 
1987, 361 et seq. and P. Pescatore, Some critical comments on the »Single European Act», 24 
CMLR 1987, 9 et seq.; further references to the position of Community officials in N. Reich, 
Competition, loc.cit. 892, Fn. 117. 
88 Cf. This is what J. H. Weiler, The European Community in Change, loc.cit. is doing to de-
fend his theory after the introduction of the Single European Act. 
89 Cf. J. Pipkom, in Gemeinschaftskommentar ztum EWGV, 4. Auflage 1991, Art. 100 a Rdnr. 
86. 
9° For the background, K. HaiJbronner, Der »nationale» Alleingang im Gemeinschaftsrecht am 
Beispiel der Abgasstandards für PKW, EuGRZ 1987, 73 et seq. 
9J lt would be helpful to evaluate the function of Art. lOO a IV in case studies. The history of 
the product safety directive could serve as a striking example that opting out is and has been used 
as a means to eliminate elements of the drafts by the Member States. 
92 Beside K. Hailbronner, loc.cit. cf. 1. Pemice, Kompetenzordnung und Handlungsbefugnisse 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiete des Umwelt~ und Technikrechts, Die Verwal-
tung 1989, 1 et seq.; cf. D.-H. Scheuing, Umweltschutz auf der Grundlage der Einheitlichen 
Europäischen Akte, EuR 1989, 152 et seq. 
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Other conflicts of the same type are already in the offing93 • It is much more lack of 
the political will of the Member States to test their freedoms under Art. 100 a IV, 
than the illegality of such an action which is at stake here. And even below litiga-
tion before the Courtof Justice, one has to consider that no one knows the indirect 
effects of Art. 100 a IV. Does the article play a role in the debates within the Coun-
cil of Ministers? Is there any country that refers to Art. 100 a IV just to indicate that 
it is not willing to follow the others? Any answer would require research. But al-
ready the legitimacy of the question justifies the fear of the Community officials. 
Political influence could prevail over the consistency of the Community legal or-
der. 
lt seems tobe worthwhiie to refer here to an action the German Govemment 
has filed against the Council94, because of Art. 9 of the General Product Safety Di-
rective95. The provision in question concerns the Commission's power to take 
measures in case of emergency situations which are legally binding for the Mem-
ber States. The Council claims competence to regulate under Art. 100 a the enforce-
ment of the directive and to give the Commission the power to execute the direc-
tive. Art. 9, although the Commissions' decision-making power is bound to a 
number of prerequisites, could be seen as a test-case to shape the responsibilities 
and the organisational structures between the Member States on the one hand and 
the Community on the other96• The legal arguments turn around the notion of Art. 
100 a V, but the conflict is in substance one of the scope of competences, the reach 
of the inherent powers of the Community. lt is significant that the German govern-
ment does not challenge the competence of the Com.munity per se to regulate prod-
uct safety, but to intrude into the administrative organisation of the Member States. 
lt remains to be seen whether the Court is willing to interpret the Maastricht 
Treaty and its reference to the subsidiarity principle in a way which supports the 
German position97• The outcome of the decision is important beyond the narrow 
93 The subject of concern here is or could become the German packaging order which con-
flicts with the EEC draft directive on packaging, OJ No. C 263, 12. 10. 1992, l et seq.; thereto 
U. Schliessner, Entwurf einer EG-Richtlinie über Verpackgungen und Verpackungsabfall und 
mögliche Auswirkungen auf die deutsche Verpackungsordnung, cf. H. W. Micklitz, The German 
Packaging Ordre, A Model for State-lnduced Risk Avoidance, in Columbia Journal of World 
Business, Focus Issue: Corporate Environmentalism Fall/Winter 1992, Volume XXVII Nos. 11 
& 4 IV, 120 et seq. 
94 Cf. Case C-359/92, in Tätigkeiten des Gerichtshofes und des Gerichts Erster fnstanz der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Woche vom 12. bis 16. Oktober l992, Nr. 26/92. 
95 Cf. OJ No. L 287, 11. 8. 1992, 24 et seq.; Ch. Joerges, Product Safety, Product Safety Law, 
Interna! Market Policy, and the Proposal for a Directive on General Product Safey, in M. Fallon/ 
F. Maniet (eds.) Product Safety and Control Processes in the EC, Brussels, 1990, 139 et seq. and 
H.-W. Mickfüz, Die Richtlinie über die allgemeine Produktsicherheit vom 29. 6. 1992, VuR 51 
1992, 261 et seq. 
96 CF. H.-W. Micklitz, Organisational Structures, loc.cit. 
97 The FRG could refer to »subsidiarity from within», cf. loc.cit. supra. 
522 Hans- W. Micklitz 
borders of product safety regulation98 , just for one reason: lt is »subsidiarity from 
within», what is at stake in one of the rare cases where it really and obviously mat-
ters. And it will be a disadvantage that there is little public concem on what is go-
ing on in Luxembourg before the Court. The subsidiarity principle provides the 
ground to raise the question, though it must not necessarily contain the answer. The 
theory on the fruitful though conflicting balance of supranationalism and intergo-
vemmentalism seems to be confirmed99 • The subsidiarity principle entitles the 
Member States to raise the question whether the inner architecture of the European 
Community could and should be built on competence rules alone. Then the ques-
tion comes up whether a strong and powerful subsidiarity principle »from within» 
drives back the Community legal order behind supremacy, pre-emption and direct 
effect. This is too short a question. lt concentrates on the present legal order, where 
the örganisational and institutional structure of the European Union is not really 
shaped, Jet alone the subsidiarity principle. lf one takes J. H. H. Weiler's momen-
tum for granted 100, the subsidiarity principle in its twofold dimension »from with-
out» - »from within» - might one day - in between the interplay of intergovem-
mentalism and supranationalism - be regarded as a tool which had saved101 the 
European Community, simply because it provided the ground for discussing all 
those issues which have so blatantly been neglected during and around Maastricht, 
with the organisational and institutional matters at its core. 
There is no answer, not yet, but the importance of the answer comes clear, if 
one contrasts the two models here taken to explain the community legal order and 
the function of the subsidiarity principle. The theory of the economic constitution 
of the European Community must f ocus on the subsidiarity principle as a rule to 
reduce social integration'°2, to reshape the pre-emption doctrine, i.e. to reconsider 
the Courts' implied power doctrine. The idea here is to have a European market and 
European rules to guarantee market integration, but to Jeave social regulation to the 
Member States. The theory of the mutual dependence of the legal order and the 
political impact of the Member States could instrumentalize the subsidiarity prin-
ciple as a means to generate arguments for the building of a Community beyond 
mere market integration. Here the democratic dimension of the subsidiarity princi-
ple could come to bear, whilst discussing powers, one will have to discuss organi-
sation structures andin between the role of individuals in such a Community103• lt 
98 lt concerns in substance the question to what extent it is legally possible under existing pri-
mary law to delegate executory powers to the Commission. 
99 Cf. J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, Joc.cit„ 2403 et seq. 
100 Which can be traced back since the early eighties at the time where he developed his theory 
of integration. 
101 Cf. The title of D. Z. Cass, loc.cit. 
102 Cf. R. Dehousse, Integration vs. Regulation? Social Regulation in the European Communi-
ty, EUI Working Paper Law No. 92/23. 
103 Cf. Ch. Joerges, The Maastricht Treaty, loc.cit. reads the reference to Member States not as 
nation states but as bearers of democracies. 
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would be misleading to play off in the concepts presented here social integration 
against market integration or vice versa. Both models struggle with the same type 
of problems, although they differ in their answers. 
III. Tue subsidiarity - legal rule and - ? - or policy instrument? 
The subsidiarity principle is prompted into a key rule. Given the pressure exercised 
on it, and the expectations set in it, be they political or legal, any answer must re-
main provisional. The theoretical implications of the subsidiarity principle for the 
further European integration process have been highlighted. The task now is to 
break the subsidiarity principle down to a workable and feasible instrument in the 
hands of politicians and lawyers. Such an attempt should be restricted to the devel-
opment of guidelines and the consideration of perspectives. There are far to many 
open questions to give definite answers. First the changing pattems of the subsidi-
arity rule are worked out, before it comes down to decide whether the subsidiarity 
rule may guide the Court's jurisprudence. 
1. Subsidiarity from without, subsidiarity from within and the individual -
the threef old extension of the subsidiarity principle 
Theoretical analysis of European integration has brought to light the distinction 
between subsidiarity »from without» (competences) and subsidiarity »from with-
in» (structures). The roots of the subsidiarity principle have tobe found elsewhere 
and they demonstrate a threefold dimension, delimiting beyond competences and 
structures the role of the individual. lt has to be worked out that »subsidiarity» has 
undergone substantial changes in less than sixty years and that the context in which 
it has been used and introduced differ considerably. Historically seen the subsidi-
arity principle has made its way from a social rule in canon law to a constitutional 
principle in the German Basic Law and now it is prepared to make a big step into a 
leading principle perhaps governing a supranational body, the European Com-
munity. 
The social context comes best clear in Pope Pius XI's Encyclical Letter, Quad-
ragesima Anno 1931, at a time where the role of the individual was threatened by a 
growing totalitarian state. The Pope wrote 104: 
» ... just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to a group 
what private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so to it is an in justice, a 
grave evil and a disturbance of the right order, for a larger and a higher associ-
ation to arrogate to it itself functions which can be performed efficiently by 
104 Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, London Catholic Truth Society, 1936, 31 para 79, here 
taken from N. Emiliou, Subsidiarity, loc.cit. 384; likewise reprinted in D. Z. Cass, loc.cit. 1111; 
in German reprinted in J. Pikorn, loc.cit. 
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smaller and lower societies. This a fundamental principle of social philosophy, 
unshaken and unchangeable. Of its very nature the true aim of all social activ-
ity should be to help members of that socia1 body, but never destroy or absorb 
them». 
The Encyclical Letter contains two messages: it draws a dividing Jine between the 
individual sphere and that of the state and it provides for a division of compe-
tence 105• The starting point, however, and this is a point to ins ist on, is the rote and 
the function of the individual in a given society, or a social body, as the Letter puts 
it106• The Federal Republic of Germany extended the social rule beyond its histori-
cal context to embrace political institutions and authorities 107 • lt was a legal re-
sponse108 to the historical experience that central authorities tend to impair the free-
dom of lower levels of government. The emphasis shifted away from the individu-
al to dividing competences - subsidiarity from without - between the national gov-
emment on the one hand and the Lander on the other. Since then subsidiarity and 
competences belong together109• Subsidiarity is the institutional side of the division 
of competences. That is why subsidiarity can only be fully understood and defined 
within the context of federalism110• 
The subsidiarity principle has been introduced in the discussion on the Euro-
pean Community when the project under consideration was to develop a European 
constitution. Subsidiarity was sustained, although the concept of fully-fledged con-
stitution for the European Community vanished 111 • The results is an imperfect trans-
plantation of a principle which has developed its füll meaning in western federa-
tions. Exactly this experience would have brought to light that the principle bears 
different concepts of federations and that it has never fully guaranteed what it 
stands for in canon law and in the federalist states. History shows that there is a 
trend in federalist states to shifting cornpetences away from the regional level to 
the central level. This is true for the United States and it is true for the Federal Re-
public of Germany 112• If any, the debate focussed on who should have competences 
105 Cf. N. Emiliou, loc.cit. 386. 
106 Again it is not possible to fully discuss the concept which lies behind the role and position 
of an individual under canon law. There is a certain need to come back to that starting point in 
the definition of the role of the »individual>> under European law, cf. supra V. 
101 Cf. J. Ziller, Droit administratif et droit communautaire: du bon usage du principe de sub-
sidiarite, in Melanges, Rene Chapus, Droit Administratif, 1992, 68 l et seq. 
wa One should not forget the way in which the Federal Republic of Germany was founded. 
There was no German peopte who elected a constitution, the Federal Republic of Germany was 
founded by the Basic law. Germans derive their idenity from that legal status, and not so much 
from their mere fact being German. 
109 Again, here is the explanation why German legal doctrine devotes so much attention to 
competences in the European legal order. 
tto Refreshingly clear, cf. N. Emiliou, loc.cit. 386. 
111 Cf. A. G. Toth, loc.cit. 1091 et seq. 
112 Cf. H.-J. Blanke, Das Subsidiaritatsprinzip als Schranke des Europäischen Gemeinschafts-
rechts, EuR 1991, 133 et seq.; v. Alstyne, The Second Death ofFederalism, 83 Mich.L.Rev. 1985, 
1709 et seq. 
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at what level - subsidiarity from without - and somewhat neglected the institution-
al/federalist implications of the centralisation process - subsidiarity from within. 
The European debate focuses on the re-allocation of power113 and sets aside the 
structural dimension although the most notable deficiencies of the Community are 
to be recognized in the lack of appropriate institutional structures. This insufficient 
and imperfect principle should now protect the Member States against the Com-
munity dictating downwards from Brussels what shall be done more effectively at 
the state level? Such a reading goes along with the German constitution, if one con-
centrates on powersharing, if one equates the Länder level with the Member States 
level and if one sets aside that those who argue this way, demonstrate a thoroughly 
federalist thinking 114• Such a reading does not comply, however, with the Encycli-
cal Letter where smaller and lower levels of the societies are mentioned as a possi-
ble alternative, it leaves subsidiarity »from within» out of consideration. Long be-
fore the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, Member States have used European 
regulation to increase their national powers to the detriment of lower societal 
units 115 • That is why the whole discussion on the subsidiarity principle even in the 
forefront of Maastricht is somewhat hypocritical. To put it bluntly: Already before 
the subsidiarity principle was shaped, the overall political purpose has been to de-
fine a weapon against excessive community powers and it has not been to find out 
where the appropriate level of regulation in a »European Union» should lie. Here 
the important difference comes into being between the concentration on compe-
tences - subsidiarity from within, and the analysis of the institutional and organi-
sational pattems - subsidiarity from without. 
The predecessors of Art. 3 b have been analysed elsewhere116• They document 
the strong relationship to the German constitution, based on a distinction between 
exclusive and concurrent powers117, which survived, at least rudimentarily, in the 
final provision of the Maastricht Treaty: 
» The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by 
this treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. 
113 Cf. D. Z. Cass, loc.cit. insist on this aspect in her efforts to trace back the roots in the Euro-
pean Community since the early seventies. 
114 Although the UK insisted that federalism should nowhere be mentioned in the Maastricht 
Treaty, cf. J. Pipkorn, loc.cit. 699. 
115 This is true for the Federal Republic of Germany and it is likewise true for the United King-
dom. Product safety regulation is a striking example, cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Organisational Struc-
tures, loc.cit.; but also broadcasting should be mentioned. The Member Stares do not demonstrate 
a unique stream-lined development. France, Spain and Italy demonstrate at the same time, that 
the very umbrella of the Community legal order gives space for enhanced regionalism, cf. J. H. 
Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, loc.cit. 2470. 
116 Cf. Notably N. Emiliou, loc.cit. and comprehensively, D. Z. Cass, loc.cit. 1110 et seq. 
117 The clarifications on those two notions given by N. Emiliou, loc.cit. 392 are very helpful 
for a non-German lawyers. 
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In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence the Community 
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in 
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be su.fficiently achieved 
by the Member States and can, therefore, by reason of the scale or ejfects of 
the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the this Treaty (emphasis put by the author)». 
Art. 3 b is different from the German constitution because there is no list of 
exclusive and concurrent powers behind on which its function and importance 
could be built118• Even the exclusive competences cannot easily assigned to the 
Community outside the Common Commercial Policy and the power to complete 
the Intemal market. Concurrent competences do not exist in the tradition of the 
German Basic Law. The Community has received limited powers in specific regu-
latory fields, like social policy, educational policy, media policy, environmental 
policy, consumer policy, and in industrial policy, regional planning and the policy 
for small and medium seized enterprises. These powers are not concretised. They 
define much more an objective the Community has to pursue than concrete tasks. 
The subsidiarity rule, as referred to in the Encyclical Letter and the German Basic 
Law is action-related, the subsidiarity rule under Art. 3 b is necessarily objective-
related' 19• And this is just another variant of the ever existing problem of the Com-
munity which is blamed for stretching its exclusive powers beyond all borders to 
achieve the politically defined objective, be it the Internal Market or the European 
Union120• 
The pre-draft Treaty operated on the basis of a »more effective attainment test» 
which was bound to an »assessment of the possible cross-boundary dimension ef-
fect» 121 • Tue »more effective attainment test»(Art. 3 b (2) scale or effects) sustained 
in connection with an »absolute necessary test», (Art. 3 b (3) necessary to achieve). 
The »cross-boundary dimension effectiveness test» reappeared somewhat hidden 
in the »better attainment test», (Art. 3 b (2) cannot sufficiently achieved/better 
achieved)122 • Both tests are interlinked and they do not provide consistent results 123 • 
The Community has first to make clear that the Member States cannot efficiently 
tis The differences are explained in N. Emiliou, loc.cit. who devotes specific attention to the 
German Basic Law, 338 et seq. and A. D. Toth, loc.cit. 1079/1987. 
119 Helpful and concise, D. Grimm. Subsidiaritat ist nur ein Uort, FAZ 17. 9. 1992, cf. J. Pikom, 
loc.cit. 699. 
12° Cf. The research done by E. Steindorff, Grenzen der EG Kompetenzen, loc.cit. and Quo 
:vadis Europa, loc.cit. 
121 Cf. Art. 12 of the draft Union Treaty drawn up by the European Parliament, OJ C 77, 1984, 
33 et seq., as reprinted in N. Emiliou, loc.cit. 391 et seq. 
122 Cf. N. Emiliou, Joc.cit. 402. 
123 Cf. A. D. Toth, loc.cit. 1097/1098 who applies Art. 3 b to the question whether the Commu-
nity should regulate water quality and comes to contradictory results under the effectiveness test 
(pro Community regulation) and under the absolute necessary test (against Community regula-
tion). 
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deal with the substance matter and then justify why it is better equipped to take the 
measures and why they must be necessarily taken at the higher Community level124• 
lt seems to be as if the criteria can best be dealt with by the development of appro-
priate procedural rules rather than by submitting them to the Courts' interpretative 
power. The shaping of the procedure must then stand for compliance with the two 
tests. This seems to be the main objective of the resolutions taken at the Edinburgh 
meeting in December 1992125• 
2. Political cooperation andlor judicial control 
Jacque/Weiler had made an attempt to formulate a provision which should entitle 
the Court to control the subsidiarity principle126• lt has been introduced in the de-
bate in a parliamentary session127, but has not reached the level of high meetings in 
the Council of Ministers128• Legal doctrine is divided. Arguments turn around the 
entire political character of the rule 129, its subjective nature 130, a possible legitima-
cy crisis of the European Court of Justice131 • Those who argue in favour of judicial 
control132, push the similarity between the subsidiarity rule and the proportionality 
rule133, though they are not identical 134• The subsidiarity principle is primarily meant 
124 Cf. J. Pipkorn, loc.cit. 699: »Die Regelung in Art. 3 b verbindet noch intensiver beide Aus-
prägungen des Subsidiaritätsprinzips (gemeint ist die Wirksamkeit und die Notwendigkeit des 
besseren Eingriffs). Die Ziele der angestrebten Maßnahme müssen wegen ihres Umfangs oder 
ihrer Wirkung besser auf EG-Ebene erreicht werden. Dies ist eine positive Rechtfertigung des 
Handlungsauftrages der Gemeinschaft. 
Doch muß sich dieser qualitative Mehrwert des Gemeinschaftshandelns gerade daraus erge-
ben, daß die Ziel auf der Ebene der Mitgliedstaaten nicht in genügendem Maße erreicht werden 
können. Damit wird der qualitative Mehrwert an die Voraussetzung des Handlungsbedarfes auf-
grund der potentiellen Unwirksamkeit der Mitgliedstaaten geknupft» (unter Berufung auf 
Schmidhauer-Hitzler, NVüZ 1992, 720 et seq. (723). 
125 Cf. Loc.cit. 11 Leitlinien im Gesamtkonzept für die Anwendung des Subsidiaritatsprinzips 
und des Artikels 3 b es Vertrags über die Europäische Union durch den Rat (Teil A, Anlage 1 ), D 
9. 
126 Cf. J.P. Jacque/J. H. H. Weiler, On the Road to European Union -A new judicial Architec-
ture: An Agenda for the Intergovernmental Conference 27 CMLR 1990, 185 et seq. 
127 Cf. D. Z. Cass, loc.cit. 1133 referring to Giscard d'Estaing, who suggested as rapporteur of 
the Community thatArt. 164 should be extended to explicitly include the principle of subsidiari-
t~, Fn. 103. 
1 8 Though it is interesting to note that J. H. Weiler pleads for judicial control to balance out 
conflicts between the legal order and the political rote of the Member States. 
129 Cf. D. Grimm, loc.cit. 
13° Cf. The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities in their Report on 
»Economic and Monetary Union and Political Union»: the test of subsidiarity can never be whol-
ly objective or consistent over time - different people regard collective action as more effective 
than individual action in different circumstances„» 
131 Cf. House of Lords, loc.cit. .. »to leave legislation open to annulment or revision by the 
Eureopan Court on such subjective grounds would lead to imnense confusion and uncertainty in 
Community law»~ cf. N. Emiliou, loc.cit. 403. 
132 Cf J. Pipkorn, loc.cit. 700. 
133 Cf. J. Pipkorn, loc.cit. 700, Fn. 14. 
134 Cf. Concise, N. Emiliou, loc.cit. 401. 
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to limit Community powers to Member States, the proportionality rule is applica-
ble to the relationship between the Community and its citizens135 • This difference 
could lose importance, if the Court is willing to bring to bear the notion in the pre-
amble of the Maastricht Treaty that decisions should be taken near to the citizen136• 
The preamble allows what has been in the Encyclical Letter the starting point for 
the definition of the subsidiarity principle: to draw a dividing line between the in-
dividual sphere and that of the state. But even where judicial control is held possi-
ble it is made clear that it could be exercised to a lirnited extent only, by way of a 
rough test to find out whether the Community organs have obviously violated the 
criteria 137. 
lt goes without saying that the Community is the primary addressee of the sub-
sidiarity principle and that it has to define procedural rules how to cope with the 
better attainment and the efficiency test. Both impose on the Commission an obli-
gation to justify why it is willing to take this and that action in a field where it has 
no exclusive competence. On the request of the COREPER the Legal Service of 
the Commission had to respond to the direct applicability of the subsidiarity prin-
ciple and on the relationship between the »effet utile» and the subsidiarity princi-
ple138. lt denied direct effect to the subsidiarity principle because it is not uncondi-
tional and not sufficiently precise and clear. The legal service points out the discre-
tion which is left to the Community organs to execute the effective and the better 
attainment test. Translated into the threefold meaning of the subsidiarity principle, 
the individual himself or herself could not base his or her right on the rule, that a 
decision has not been taken at the appropriate level 139• 
Such a reading goes along with the interpretation given to Art. 5, if one follows 
the jurisprudence as spelt out in Casati 140 and Webb 141 • Any opinion on the relation-
ship between Art. 3 b and the »effet utile» touches on the implied powers doctrine. 
Without really discussing the issue, the Legal Service referred to Kramer142 and the 
opinion 1/91 143, where the doctrine was fully developed in the field of extemal re-
lations and then applied to the agreement between the Community and the EFTA 
countries. The same position is taken by N. Emiliou who even interprets Art. 3 b 
(1) as express recognition of the doctrine of implied powers 144• This seems too easy 
135 Cf. N. Emilou, loc.cit. 03 with references from the Courts' case-law; cf. A. D. Toth, loc.cit. 
1083. 
136 Cf. J. Pipkorn, loc.cit. 700. 
137 Cf. N. Emiliou, loc.cit. 404, in a similar sense with reference to the German constitutionaJ 
court, J. Pipkorn, loc.cit.700. 
138 Cf. Note a l'attention de MMS et MM les Directeurs Generaux et Chefs de Service, Brux-
elles, 26. 10. 1992, SEC (92) 2019. 
139 Cf. Infra, at the end of III.2„ where the indirect opportunities are discussed. 
14° Cf. ECR Judgement of 11. 11. 1981, 203/80, 2595 et seq. 
141 Cf. ECR Judgement of 17. 12. 1981, 279/80, 3305 et seq. 
142 Cf. ECR Judgement of 14. 7. 1976, 6176, No. 19-20, 1309 et seq. 
143 Cf.Opinion 1/91, 14.12.1991,No.21,0J 110,29.April 1992, 11 etseq. 
144 Cf. Loc.cit. 399. 
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an answer, although the legal service opens up a door to bring the implied power 
doctrine and the subsidiarity principle together. The subsidiarity principle should 
serve as a means to interpret the existing doctrine. This is not too far away from 
J. Pipkorn's statement that the Court should apply the »effet utile» now in a restric-
tive way145 • lt would result in a process of reconsidering basic principles of the 
Community legal order. 
Much clearer on the possible consequences are the statements presented at the 
interinstitutional conference on the subsidiarity principle and transparency held in 
Brussels on the lOth of November 1992146• The conference expresses the need for 
joint action by the Community organs. European Parliament and the Commission 
both are under political pressure, and both fear that the subsidiarity principle is used 
to challenge the institutional balance as provided for in the Treaty. The Commis-
sion feels concemed that the Member States will exercise control over the right of 
the Commission to introduce legal acts, the European Parliament is worried be-
cause of its possible impact on the »acquis communautaire». Might be that the 
newly introduced right to take action will be reshaped in the light of the subsidiari-
ty principle 147• Under the 27th of November 1992, the Commission has published 
its communication to the Council and to the European Parliament on the subsidi-
arity principle148• lt contains both elements subsidiarity »from without» and subsid-
iarity »from within». 
The document provides first for a classification of measures for which the 
Community has no exclusive powers. Here it is subsidiarity from without, the clas-
sical reallocation of powers, what is done. The document distinguishes between 
legislative measures, joint measures, contributory measures and complimentary 
measures and underlines the need to reconsider the possibility of using directives 
which are restricted to formulating a real frame rather than to lay down concrete 
rights and obligations. Subsidiarity from within comes into play! As criteria for 
taking action it mentions a comparative efficiency test and a surplusvalue test, just 
other words for the effective and better attainment test. How the Commission will 
carry out these tests remains open, with one notable exception. The Commission is 
prepared to conclude an interinstitutional agreement and the Edinburgh meeting has 
confirmed its necessity 149• Such an agreement does not yet exist, but it lies within 
subsidiarity from within to develop procedural rules which integrate the relevant 
actors in order to secure consent before the Commission starts an initiative. Public 
145 Cf. Loc.cit. 700. 
146 Note a J'attention des membres de la commission et des directeurs generaux, Confärence 
interinstitutionelle sur las subsidiarite et 1a transparence, tenue a Bruxelles, el 10 novembre 1992, 
SEC (92) 2163. 
147 The Court of Justice has granted the Parliament standing, Case 70/88, Judgement of 22. 5. 
1990, ECR 1990, 2041, Art. 173 (3) as revised. 
148 Cf. SEK (92) 1990 endg.12. 
149 Cf. Loc.cit. III. Verfahren und Praxis, D 9. 
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attention should focus on the shaping of the procedure. The rules set out here could 
be submitted to the Court when it comes down to decide a case. Even if the Mem-
ber States due to its political character are not legally entitled to challenge a Com-
munity decision because it violates the subsidiarity principle, they cannot prevent 
the national courts from exactly raising that question, if a private individual in a 
given case builds an argument on the violation of the subsidiarity principle to bis 
detriment150• Just two questions: who should have access to the negotiations, and 
should they be held publicly?151 
IV. Considerations for a new reading of the subsidiarity principle 
The traditional reading of the subsidiarity principle strengthens the political influ-
ence of the Member States on the Community. lt increases the weight of the inter-
govemmental side of the balance or in the terms of the theory of the »Ordnungs-
politik», it allows to challenge the existing legal order, mainly the pre-emption 
doctrine. The pendulum swings away from the community legal order to the polit-
ical order. Exactly this movement away from a formalistic, rigid152 legal order, how-
ever, gives scope for the intellectual development, - i.e. for the intellectual further-
ance of the Community legal order! There is a mutual dependence of the two ele-
ments of European integration, supranationalism and intergovemmentalism 153 • The 
political impact of the subsidiarity principle provides the ground for the search of 
legal(!) relief strategies. 
The heading of this section is chosen in order to demonstrate the provisional 
character of the interpretation proposed here. Tue basic idea is to lay down lines of 
arguments which should and which must be further developed in order to transform 
them into legal principles. Such an approach allows to tie the considerations for a 
new reading of the subsidiarity principle to the theories of integration. The first 
consideration tums the classical reading of the subsidiarity principle as a means to 
reallocate powers - subsidiarity from without - upside down, and raises the ques-
tion whether it could become a means to generate responsibilities instead of mere-
ly defending competences. The second consideration aims at the inner architecture 
of the community legal order, it advocates a modified pre-emption doctrine 154 • 
15° Cf. N. Emiliou, loc.cit. 404. 
151 Some progress might result from the decisions taken in Edinburgh on the transparency of 
the work which is done at the Council level, cf. loc.cit. D 14. 
152 Cf. J. Bengoetxa, Institutions, Legal Theory and EEC Law, ARSP 1989, 195 et seq. Accord-
ing to J. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, loc.cit. 2476 the formal, non-ideological char-
acter of the Community legal order is bound to the unanimity principle. 
153 Cf. J. H. Weiler, loc.cit. 2426. 
154 Cf. Already, H.-W. Micklitz, Organisational Structures, loc.cit. and H.-W. Micklitz/ 
N. Reich, Verbraucherschutz im Vertrag über die Europäische Union, loc.cit. 
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A concept of shared competences could make the Community legal order more 
flexible and invalidate the Community's encroachment on the Member States' 
powers155• Both aspects contain an element of »competition» bottom-up, of »inter-
brand» competition156 and they provide for a comprehensive view on the both ele-
ments of subsidiarity - from without and from within. 
1. Consequences of subsidiarity from without- the emergent doctrine 
of responsibility 
Under the 6th of July the »Independent» published a cartoon, showing J. Major as 
the subsidiarityman157• On the left hand side he is telling the Commission »Thanks 
to my super hero powers you can't tell me what to do», on the right hand side, he 
is telling the local gov.: »thanks to my super hero powers, I can tell you what to 
do». Seen this way the subsidiarity principle provides for an assumption that all 
(non exclusive) powers are vested in the Member States158 • At the perspective 
seems correct. At a second glance one might raise doubts on the message inherent 
to that cartoon. Does it catch the vertical distribution of competences correctly is 
the first question? And the second one concems the neglected horizontal dimension 
between the Member States. 
The subsidiarity principle cannot be used as a mere weapon of Member States 
to refute Community activities. lt has been introduced to better balance out conflicts 
between the Community and the Member States. lnherent in the principle of sub-
sidiarity lies a positive constructive element, which would mean, that the Member 
States might have to support the Community in the development of adequate rules 
to achieve the objectives of the Community159• Subsidiarity does not aim at the 
shaping of competence structures alone which brings together or divides Member 
States and the Community, it encourages the allocation of competence on the basis 
of efficiency rather than nationality160• Put this way, the notion of subsidiarity loses 
its destructive, defensive touch and could transform to an able instrument in the 
shaping of the Community legal order after 1992. If the German Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs intends to set aside each and every measure under discussion in the 
Community organs to improve consumer protection at the Community level, the 
155 E. Steindorff, Quo Vadis, loc.cit. uses the argument, but does not draw the conclusion here 
proposed, 43. 
156 Cf. N. Reich, Competition, loc.cit. 899 et seq. and 895: »The more competences the Com-
munity is acquiring, the less exclusive will be its jurisdiction, and the more »interbrand» compe-
tition between legal orders will take place». 
157 Cf. The Independent, Monday 6 July 1992, page 20. 
158 Cf. A. D. Toth, loc.cit. 1103. 
159 Cf. This is what the Comrnission is stressing in its cornrnunication, Ioc.cit. 
16° Cf. St. Weatherill, in Federalism and Responsibility, loc.cit. Some support can be drawn 
from N. Emiliou, loc.cit. 402 with reference to 402, though the argument is not developed. 
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responsibility for consumer protection which was largely delegated away from the 
Member States to the Commission and the European Parliament will fall back on 
the national governments 161 • Member States have used the activities of the Com-
mission as a pretext to stay away from own initiatives. 
lt has already been mentioned that the Member States have taken secondary 
Community law, to concentrate powers at the national level to the detriment of low-
er levels162• Legal measures adopted at the Community level are directed to the 
Member States, and the Court has constantly made clear that the Member States 
are free in the way they build up the necessary infrastructure to secure compliance 
with European law 163 • One should not forget, however, that the Court of Justice has 
likewise obliged national courts and national administrations to enforce Comrnu-
nity law 164• Here lies an important potential for national courts and national admin-
istrations at the lower level to bring to bear European law and to somewhat coun-
teract the centralistic tendency which is inherent to Community law165 • Member 
States with a federalistic structure, like the FRG, might even benefit from legisla-
tive activities taken at the Länder level 166• 
What the Cartoon does not cover, but what is already in the political and the 
legal discussion is a revision of the responsibilities incumbent upon on national and 
even regional administrations in the extraterritorial enforcement of Community 
law 167 • lt is the horizontal dimension of Community law, it is Art. 5 of the Treaty 
of Rome which could and must be reshaped in the light of the subsidiarity rule 168• 
The Commission is constantly arguing that enforcement could be secured only if 
161 The point then is, at least in civil law, whether conflict rules suffice to solve transboundary 
consumer litigtions. 
162 Cf. Reference in the field of product safety regulation, H.- W. Micklitz, Organisational 
Structures, loc.cit. 
163 Cf. ECR 1971Case39/70, 49 et seq„ cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Internationales Produktsicherheits-
recht, loc.cit. 403 et seq. 
164 As far as the administrations are concerned, ECR 1989, 1839, 1870 et seq. - Constanzo/ 
Mailand= EuZW 1990, 296 et seq.; thereto Fischer, NVwZ 1992, 635; as far as the courts are 
concerned, ECR 1984, 1891, 1908 et seq. - von Colson and Kaman. 
1
6.5 Initiatives have been at the local level, to build up the necessary knowhow to enforce Euro-
pean law, where the national government has failed to transfrom secondary Community law into 
national law. 
166 lt is not the place here to discuss the German Basic Law. lt has tobe recalled, however, that 
Art. 23 was amended and the influence of the Länder strengthens within the ratification process 
in the German Bundestag, cf. BGBI. Jahrgang 1992, Teil I, 20 86 et seq. Gesetz zur Änderung 
des Grundgesetzes vom 2 l. Dezember 1992. There is an overwhelming literature on the interla-
tionship between the Maastricht Treaty and the German Basic Law, cf. in the context of the Eu-
ropean legal order Ch. Joerges, Maastricht Treaty, loc.cit. 
167 Cf. P. Sutherland, The Interna! Market After 1992, Meeting the Challenge, Report to the EC 
Commission by the High Level Group on the Operation of Interna! Market, 1992. 
168 Cf. The results from the Edinburgh meeting, loc.cit. l. Grundprinzipien under 4, D. 8. The 
subsidiarity principle does not eliminate Art. 5, quite the contrary is true, it strengthens the al-
ready developed horizontal dimension of Art. 5 in the Court's jurisprudence, cf. J. Temple Lang, 
Community Constitutional Law, Art. 5 EEC Treaty, CMLR 1990, 645 et seq. 
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Member States build up mutual confidence to increase compliance and enforce-
ment16.9. lt is only one step to cornbine enforcement with the mutual recognition 
principle {home country control) and to oblige Member States authorities to con-
trol all kind of risks which are originated from that very Member State and which 
endanger the citizens of other Member States170• Such a rule could easily backed 
with the subsidiarity principle, although the Member States have refused to inte-
grate a provision on cooperation of administrations in the Maastricht Treatyl71 • One 
may formulate in a much rnore ambitious way and state, what is needed and what 
might be possible is to reshape the notion of »state» under European 172• 
2. Consequences of subsidiarity from within - the building of a new architecture 
on the basis of shared competences 
Community law draws a clear line between total and minimum harmonisation. 
Harmonjsation under Art. 100 a is total. Harmonisation in specific policy sectors is 
bound to certain type of measures and most of all restricted to the adoption of min-
imum standards. The point at stake then has been and still is, how to decide which 
rule applies, e.g. Art. 100 a or Art. 130 s, Art. 118a or Art. 129 a. One approach is to 
distinguish between measures which relate to the Intemal Market and those that are 
not. The Court of J ustice has justified the application of Art. 100 a if the measure 
concems both: the Internal Market and the policy outside the Internal Market. The 
Court referred to Art. 100 a because the position of the parliament is stronger here 
due to cooperation procedure, Art. 149173• Competence is linked to the notion of 
democracy, a consequence which does not facilitate the search for a solution be-
cause the Maastricht Treaty will add a fourth type of parliamentary participation to 
169 Cf. Communication of the Commission, Ioc.cit. and the speach of J. Delors, loc.cit. on the 
role and function of subsidiarity; cf. in that context ECR Case 25/88, Ministere Pubkic v. E:R. 
Wurmser, judgement of 11. 5. 1989, No. 17 and thereo N. Reich, Interna! Market, loc.cit. No. 
46. 
17° Cf. Path-breaking N. Reich, Rechtsprobleme grenzüberschreitender irreführender Werbung 
im Binnenmarkt, 56 (1992) RabelsZ , 444 et seq. 
171 As foreseen in Art. 5 of the Luxemburg Draft of June 1991, cf. Ch. Joerges, loc.cit. 
172 Again it would be a subject to investigate in depth. The Court of J ustice seems to develop a 
view of state which raises doubts on its acceptability and compatibility with traditional national 
understanding. cf. D. Curtain, The Province of Government: Delimiting the Direct Effect of Di-
rectives in the Common Law Context, ELR 1990, 195 et seq.; N. Reich, Competition, loc.cit. 
884 et seq. both discussing the interrelationship between the EEC competition rules and nation-
al supply monopolies. 
Even more important is an analysis of the relationship between the erosion of the principle 
of the enumerated powers and c1assica1 function of a state. Powers are generated at the Commu-
nity level, but there is no »state» behind the powers, cf. J. H. Weiler, The Transformation of 
Europe, loc.cit. 2446. The European Community is not only a market without a state, Ch. Joerg-
es, Markt ohne Staat, Ioc.cit. or, a legal system without a state, Koopmanns, Editorial Comment, 
loc.cit. it seems to become a state which do no langer take over traditional state functions. 
173 Cf. M. Zuleeg, Umweltschutz in der Rechtsprechung der Europaischen Gemeinschaft, NJW 
1993. 31 et seq. 33. 
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the already existing three: the Art. 189 b procedure which provides parliament with 
a right to veto. 
The Court is expected to adjucate on the legality of Community acts on the 
basis of Art. 3 b. Whether it can develop rules on the interpretation of Art. 3 b re-
mains to be seen. If one will not leave the solution on the character of Art. 3 b to 
the Court alone, one has to take a new look at the di vision of responsibilities? Why 
not restrict the Community power to adopt minimum standards in all fields outside 
the four freedoms and the competition rules and leave it to the Member States to 
decide whether they want to go beyond that level playing field? Such a view, 
though based on a re-allocation of competences, provides the ground for building 
a new Community architecture, one in the direction of »Co-operative federalism» 
rather than the German or American type of centralised federalism 174 • 
The leading idea is to seek the solution in the allocation of competences on the 
basis of efficiency and not in the fruitless differentiation between Intemal Market 
related measures and pure non market-related measures175 • Efficiency means to 
decide what can be done best at what level. If one accepts that the Community can-
not survive as an Interna! Market alone, but that it must meet the social challenge 
and transfonn the near-to completed Interna! Market into a social European space, 
then it is necessary to enable the Community to take action at the European level 
and to prevent the subsidiarity principle from becomingjust another hurdle to over-
come in the transfonnation of Europe176• The subsidiarity principle would streng-
then the assumption of an ob1igation ofthe Member States to contribute to the elab-
oration of such rules. Such a concept could work only if the distinction between Art. 
100 a and the non-exclusive competence rules in the non-economic area is tumed 
down. Measures under Art. 100 a would then per se be possible only as minimum 
rules, total harmonisation should not be excluded, but should no longer be the rule. 
So far, there is little evidence in the Treaty and in the case-law which could 
back such a concept of shared competences 177• A new reading of Art. I 00 a N might 
pave the pay178 • If Art. 100 a IV is no longer seen then as an exemption rule, but as 
an instrument whose emergence can only be explained with the necessity to main-
tain competences in the hands of the Member States and to ensure that sharing com-
petence will not entail disintegrating effects. Does the idea of shared concepts en-
danger the »acquis communautaire», because the pre-emption doctrine would be 
watered down? One might at the same time ask, whether it is really a danger or 
174 Cf. This message is contained in Ch. Joerges, loc.cit. but not really developed. 
175 Or in retroactive and active, as E. Steindorff, Quo Vadis, loc.cit. puts it now. 
176 This is the heading of J. H. Weiler's article in the Yale Law Journal, loc.cit. 
177 Cf. J. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, loc.cit. 2479 speaks of »shared sovereign-
ty». 
178 That is, what we have tried, H.-W. MicklitzfN. Reich, Verbraucherschutz im Vertrag über 
die Europäische Union, Ioc.cit.; N. Reich, Competition of legal orders, loc.cit. Art. 100 a IV con-
stitutes already a break to the pre-emption doctrine, cf. J. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Eu-
rope, loc.cit. 2458. 
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whether it is not a progress. Tue Comrnunity is based on the idea that it has compe-
tence only as far as the Treaty provides it for. The principle of a restricted transfer 
of competence is bound to the understanding of the Community as a supranational 
body which is different from a state. If law-rnaking at the community level is bound 
to the adoption of minimum standards, then there might be an opportunity to re-
think the perspecti ves of the Community legal order. The subsidiarity principle 
could become a sort of a hinge bringing together internal market thinking and so-
cial integration, shaping cooperative federalist structures instead of re-allocating 
powers. 
V. Outlook - Tue subsidiarity principle and the position 
of the individual 
The new reading allows one to get to grips with the competence dimension and the 
institutional implications of the subsidiarity rule. The third climension of the sub-
sidiarity principle is still missing: Its starting point, as spelt out in the Encyclical 
Letter179, has lost importance over the decades and shifted the attention away from 
the individual to the institutional and organisational side ofthe principle. lt is tempt-
ing to dig into the notion of the individual undercanon law and to evaluate to what 
extent that very perception is inherently transferred to the institutional setting of the 
European Community180• For the purpose of this piece of work it suffices to recall 
that the Encyclical Letter shows a perception of the »state» where protection 
against the state is the striking issue (security), whereas social regulation involves 
protection by the state (safety)l8l. Even that change could not set aside, however, 
that the individual and his position in a given society is and rnust be the starting 
point for the developrnent of social structures. That very lack of concem in the 
Maastricht Treaty demonstrates a significant neglect of the role and the legal posi-
tion of individuals in the Community. Decisions shall be taken »citizennear», that 
seems to be all what remained from the initiative of the European Parliament to 
integrate in the Maastricht Treaty a set of.social rights182• The subsidiarity principle 
in Art. 3 b a11owing for or even requiring citizen-near decision-making may not bear 
the development and the integration of social rights into the Treaty. Here an addi-
179 Cf. loc.cit. »just as it is wrong to withdraw frorn the individual„» or in German »Wie das~ 
jenige was der Einzelmensch aus eigener Initiative und mit seinen eigenen Kräften leisten kann, 
ihm nicht entzogen werden darf ... », cf. D. Grimm, loc.cit. 
180 An in-depth analysis would require to discuss the constitutional relationship between states 
and churches, the concordats, and to define the different views on the individual. 
181 For the context of social rights in the European Community, cf. H .-W. Micklitz, Consumer 
Rights, loc.cit. 
182 Cf. Declarations of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, PE 132.563=EuGRZ 1989, 204 et 
seq.; thereto B. Beutler, Die Erklarung des Europäischen Parlaments über die Grundrechte und 
Grundfreiheiten, vom 12. 4. 1989, EuGRZ 1989, 185 et seq. 
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tional input is needed. lt should have to do with the placement of the individual in 
the Community legal order and in the context of social regulation with organised 
individuals, with social groups who try to bring to bear raise their voices. Right here 
subsidiarity comes together with democracy. The democratic deficit of the Euro~ 
pean Community is not restricted to the imperfect shaping of the European Parlia-
ment, it is nowhere better feit than in the representation of diffuse interests at the 
Comrnunity level 183 • One might wonder whether the Court of Justice could and 
should take the initiative again. 
1. The emergence of social rights for individuals and the role of the Court of Justice 
The Court has granted individual rights under European law to enforce the four 
freedoms of the Treaty. The four freedoms have transformed to individual enforce-
able rights. The Court, however, has gone further. It has developed and it is devel-
oping social rights out of the Art. 36184• Primary addressee of these social rights, 
whether they are derived from Art. 36 and/or frorn secondary Community law185, 
are the Member States. Art. 36 approaches the Member States and the directives 
are addressed to the Member States. All that the Court is doing in order to enhance 
the position of the individual in the field of social rights is to supervise the Member 
States in that they provide adequate means in their national legal systems for the 
enforcement of European law 186• Such ajurisprudence constitutes a promising and 
powerful way to secure the enforcement of European 1aw187• Difficulties could 
come up, if the concept of shared powers in the field of social regulation would 
receive support and legal status. Does it lead to shared mechanisms of law enforce-
ment? Member States could and should use the lee-way under the shared powers 
The Edinburgh meeting in December 1992 tries to clarify what should be understood by cit-
izen-near, loc.cit. And it might uell be that the real progrees is made here and not so much in the 
struggle on the subsidiarity principle. 
183 Cf. J. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, loc.cit. 2453, although he sets aside that 
the legislative machinery at the Community level provides lee-way for exercising influence 
where it does not even exist at the national level, cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Internationales Produkt-
sicherheitsrecht, loc.cit. 
184 Cf. E. Steindorff, Quo vadis, loc.cit. who elaborates how the Court of Justice encouraged 
and fostered the development of social rights beyond the limits of Community power. The Court, 
however, goes even one step further. lt develops under the notion of negative integration social 
rights, cf. van Heydebrand u.d. Lasa, H.-Ch. Free Movement of Foodstuffs, Consumer Protec-
tion and Food Standards in the EC: Has the Court of Justice got it Wrong?, 16 European Law 
Review, 1991, 391 et seq.; cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Internationales Produktsicherheitsrecht, 1992, 329 
et seq. where the attempt is undertaken to prove that the Court has already developed a right to 
safety. 
185 Here the Federal Republic of Germany provides indirectly the ground for the furtherance 
of the jurisprudence in its reJuctant and insufficient transformation of secondary community law 
in the field of environmental protection into national law, cf. M. Zuleeg, loc.cit. 
186 Helpful and clear, M. Zuleeg, loc.cit. 37. 
187 Cf. St. Weatherill, National Remedies and Equal Access to Public Procurement, Yearbook 
of European Law, 10 (1990), 243 et seq. and the remarks made by Judge M. Zuleeg, loc.cit. 37. 
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rule for an indigenous development of enforcement mechanisms. It is quite anoth-
er issue how and if national enforcement mechanisms could and should be europe-
anized 188. 
A much more elegant ambitious concept would be to build social, European-
wide enforceable rights, directly on secondary Cornmunity law189 • One could make 
an argument out of the interrelationship between primary and secondary Commu-
nity law. Primary law guarantees primarily the four freedoms, secondary Commu-
nity law focuses nearly entirely on social regulation. The enforcement of the four 
freedoms have led to the establishment of a »Europäische Wirtschaftsverfassung», 
enforcement of secondary Community law could contribute to the development of 
a Community which reaches beyond mere market integration. The Court has al-
ready gone far that way, although it still refuses to grant directives horizontal ef-
fect190. It seems tobe, as if the Court is not willing to go much further than »Fran-
covich»191. The debate on a possible horizontal effect would gain importance and 
reappear in a new light if the Member States refute or delay the transformation of 
directives into national law by reference to the subsidiarity principle192• 
The Court has tobe much more systematically approached by the holders of 
the social rights, be it individually or be hin form of organised enforcement. This 
might be the only opportunity to test, what the Court is prepared to grant private 
individuals as enforceable social rights. lt suffices to recall that the making of a con-
stitution 193 started with van Gend en Los, not with supremacy or pre-emption, but 
with direct effect. Then, it was a market citizen, an importer, who took the initia-
tive. Only in the light of time it becomes clear how systematically the doctrine of 
direct effect has been used to implement the four freedoms and to give shape to the 
»Wirtschaftsverfassung» of the European Community194• Now, it rests on the citi-
zens, the workers and the consumers to bring their cases to the Court and to see 
whether it is willing to follow suit195• Building a constitution bottom up and step by 
step through the Court of Justice provides lee-way for imagination. The private 
citizen, again as an individual or as participant of a social group which takes care 
of his/her interests, will have to play a much more important role than he or she 
188 The concept of minimum standards presupposes that there are ways and means of coopera-
tion between the Member States and the Community Organs to constantly review the rninimum 
standards, cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Internationales Produktsicherheitsrecht, loc.cit. 388 et seq. 
189 Cf. Götz, Europäische Gesetzgebung durch Richtlinien, NJW 1992, 1949 et seq. 
190 Cf. For an overview, N. Reich, Protection of consumers' economic interests by the EC, 14 
(1992) Sydney Law Review, 23 et seq. 
191 Cf. Case C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich, Judgement of 19. 11. 1991, EuZW 1991, 758 et 
seq. 
192 Cf. N. Reich, Competition, loc.cit. 877 et seq. 
193 Cf. G. F. Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, CMLR 26 1989, 595 et seq. 
194 Cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Organisierte Rechtsdurchsetzung im Binnenmarkt, loc.cit. and Ch. 
Harding, Who goes to Court in Europe, loc.cit. 
195 Cf. Ch. Pollmann, Die Rolle des Rechts bei der Durchsetzung der EG-Freizügigkeit, KritV 
1990, 23 et seq.; cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Organisierte Rechtsdurchsetzung im Binnenmarkt, loc.cit. 
538 Hans-W. Micklitz 
already believes 196• He and she could push the initiative which has somewhat shift-
ed to the Member States back to the Court, in order to strengthen legal suprantion-
alism against political intergovernmentalism. The Court might have to compensate 
for the deficiencies the Member States left even after Maastricht in the developing 
a concept for a true European constitution gi ving shape to the role of the European 
citizen197• 
2. The prominent role of the »individual» in the European »Community» 
The moment has come to reconsider the role of the individual in the European le-
gal order, the role and function of an individual who is not entrepreneur, but social 
citizen. First of all there is no European social citizen198• lt is one constitutive ele-
ment of the Treaty that the individual is dealt with in relation to the four freedoms. 
He is the one who benefits from the four freedoms, as a consumer, whose choice is 
increased in the Interna! Market or as a worker, who is gi ven the right to work 
wherever he or she wants in the Community. 
The Court of Justice has recognized the legal position of the Consumer under 
Art. 30199 though it is not yet clear whether and to what extent rights flow from that 
legal status; it has stretched the notion of worker beyond its meaning and has con-
tributed considerably to develop and to improve the position of students200 in Eu-
rope and the role of the woman201 • These efforts should be tied together in order to 
develop a notion and a concept of the private individual under European law. A new 
impetus for the re-consideration of the individual might strikingly enough derive 
from consumer protection. For years consumer protection was a neglected subject 
spelt out in two policy programmes and a number of declarations of the Council202 • 
In a market-orientated integration process, consumer protection must gain impor-
tance beyond the attention given to it in the national context. This is all the more 
196 We do not believe that the non-availability of a group actions substantially restrains access 
to justice, cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Organisierte Rechtsdurchsetzung, loc.cit. 
197 This has already been the case in the sixites, when the Court held the construct together, cf. 
J. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, loc.cit. 2425. Today the situation is different due to 
the erosion of the principle of enumerated powers. And rumour goes, that the landmark decisions 
are not in the pipeline. 
198 Cf. Th. Hoogenboom, „for non-EEC nationals, cf. Symposium: The Status of Non-commu-
nity Officials in Community Law, contributions published in European Journal of International 
Law, 1992, l et seq. 
199 Cf. Case C-362/88, Judgement of 7. 3. 1990, ECR EuZW 1990, 667 - GB-INNO. 
200 Cf. Case 293/83 - Gravier v. City of Liege ECR 1985, 593 et seq. and Case 295/90 - Eras-
mus ECR 1990, 
wi Cf. S. Raasch, Perspektiven für die Gleichberechtigung im EG-Binnenmarkt '92, KJ 1990, 
62 etseq.; H. Dieball, Gleichbehandlung von Frau und Mann im Recht der EG,AuR 6/1991, 166 
et seq.; N. Reich/H. Dieball, Mittelbare Diskriminierung teilzeitbeschäftigter Betriebsratsmit-
glieder, AuR 8/1991, 225 et seq.; 
202 Cf. First Consumer Programme, OJ No. C 92, 25. 4. 1975; Second Consumer Programme 
OJ No. C 133, 3. 6. 1981; for the present state for development, cf. K. v. Miert, Verbraucher und 
der Binnenmarkt, Drei-Jahres Aktionsplan, EuZw 1990, 401 et seq. 
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true as the Member States delegated their competence away to the Commission and 
the Community, more as a pretext then as a real policy. Step by step the Commu-
nity developed consumer protection rules. Now the Member States have to realize 
that consumer protection by its integration into the Treaty of Maastricht has even 
obtained quasi constitutional status203• Seen against that background it is no longer 
surprising, that legal doctrine is devoting more and more attention to the envisaged 
or the already adopted European rules and directives204• Consumer protection has 
become the red herring for the proponents of the Ordnungspolitik, which proves in 
a sense that consumer protection at the European Community level has already 
become an instrument for the furtherance of the Community legal order. The Com-
mission grasps the nettle when it tries to use the consumer to compensate for the 
difficiencies resulting from mechanisms of law-enforcement which is bound to the 
territory of the Member States205• What is needed, is an entirely new European the-
ory on the position of individual rights in the Treaty in order to comply with the 
third dimension of the subsidiarity principle: The shaping of the dividing line be-
tween the individual and the »state», i.e. the European Community as an institu-
tional body, build to integrate markets but in a process of transition to encompass 
the individual. 
203 Cf. E. Steindorff, loc.cit. with reference to the amendment of Art. 23 of the German Basic 
Law; references may be found in Ch. Joerges, The Maastricht Treaty, loc.cit. 
204 Cf. E. Steindorff, Quo vadis, loc.cit. and P.-Ch. Mtiller~Graff, loc.cit. 
205 Cf. Mainly P. Sutherland, loc.cit. 
